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In competitive markets agents may buy and sell commodities at para-
metric prices and without quantity contraints. In the "textbook" loan market,
for example, it is postulated that individuals may borrow and lend in unlimited
amounts at a fixed market interest rate. The implausibility of this assumption
has long been granted for the loan market, and economists have generally
accepted "the imperfection of capital markets." Because of the difficulties of
contract enforcement, and moral hazards in the behavior of debtors, it is
recognized that individuals and firms are often constrained in borrowing.
Indeed, certain "paradoxes of borrowing" seem to rule out, a priori, the logical
possibility of purely competitive borrowing without quantity constraints.
Numerous authors have now shown how certain legal and economic institu-
tions may serve to overcome incentive problems in the loan market. Problems of
moral hazard in corporate borrowing, for example, may often be reduced through
the use of bond covenants, seniority of debt, bankruptcy provisions, etc. The
capital structure of the firm may itself be designed to counteract certain
incentive effects of loans. The losses in firm valuation that attach to the
irreducible moral hazards in the loan market have been termed the "agency cost
of debt."
The efficiency problems of loan markets are dramatically magnified in
the international setting, where problems of contract enforcement become ende-
mic. With international loans, there is no uniform commercial code governing
the design and interpretation of contracts, and no international policing power
available for contract enforcement. Civil remedies for breach of contract will
typically be different under the distinct legal systems of the creditor and deb-
tor, and there may be acute difficulties for a creditor to obtain and enforce a
legal judgement against a debtor in the latter's political jurisdiction.
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For many international loans, repayment depends on the enlightened
self—interest of the debtor rather than on legal compulsion. Debtors may have
strong incentives to maintain reputation if they make repeated trips to the loan
market, and so may have incentives to repay loans even if each individual loan
agreement is not directly enforceable. In cases where self—interest for
repayment is not strong the loan market may simply collapse, with mutually
advantageous opportunities for trade left unexploited.
The problems of sustaining international loans are compounded further
in the case of LDC debtors. Though the value of borrowing formany LDCs may be
high the incentives for defaulting on international debt may be higher still.
In many developing countries, in addition, the legal systems are relatively
undeveloped and often not independent of other political institutions, so that
legal remedies against default are very weak. The doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity, in addition to political realities, may bar any legal remedies against
defaults by the LDC government itself. Even though defaults by LDC borrowers
may be rare, the threat of default hangs over lending to LDCs and importantly
conditions the behavior of banks and LDC borrowers.
Default risk is probably in large part responsible for four charac-
teristics of LDC borrowing in the international markets. First, most borrowing
from LDCs is either (a) by the central government; (b) by private firms and
parastatals with a central government guarantee; or (c) by large, creditworthy
multinational firms operating within the LDC. There is little unguaranteed cre-
dit undertaken by indigenous, private LDC borrowers beyond very short—term trade
financing. The IMF estimates that of the $359.5 billion of medium— and long—
term debt of LDC borrowers in 1979, only $71.6 billion (20 percent) was non-
public or nonguaranteed debt, and much of this was borrowing by multinational
firms.
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Second, by the report of the banking community and the evidence of
actual borrowing in recent years, many countries are simply shut—out from
medium-term commercial loans. Country-risk analysts often rank countries
according to "creditworthiness," i.e. their ability to attract capital inflows,
and suggest that different loan markets require different standards of credit-
worthiness. For example, the Eurobond market is supposedly reserved for the
very best credit risks, with only 15—20 countries able to float long—term debt
in the market, and with Mexico and Brazil accounting for over 50 percent of
non—OPEC LDC Eurobond flotations in recent years. The syndicated loan market of
the Euro—banking community is less restrictive, and export—import credits that
are guaranteed by the governments of creditor nations are less restrictive yet.
Most low—income LDCs continue to rely almost entirely on non—commercial con—
cessionary loans from international agencies and other official creditors for
their balance of payments financing.
Third, most non—concessionary financing by the LDCs is through banks
rather than publicly held bonds. According to the IMF, bond flotations supplied
only percent of gross foreign financing for 94 LDCs countries during 1973-1979.
Far and away the most popular financing vehicle is the syndicated roll—over
credit, offered by banks in the Euro—loan market. This is a short-maturity
instrument (almost always seven years or less) with a variable interest rate
tied to fluctuations in LIBOR, or to the U.S. prime rate or other interest rate
indicator. Before 1931, most LDC borrowing was instead raised in bond markets.
We will suggest that the capacity of banks and LDC governments to negotiate when
the country enters a debt crisis (and the inability of bond—holders to do so
adds markedly to the efficiency of the loan markets.
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A fourth characteristic of international lending that is tied to
default risk is the heavy reliance on short-term instruments for long-term
financing. On theoretical grounds, we argue, there is a presumption against
long—term borrowing in a situation where bond covenants or debt seniority privi-
leges do not exist.
This paper presents a theoretical model to describe the effects of
default risk on international lending to LDC sovereign borrowers. It extends
the important work of Eaton and Gersovitz [i 980,1981], which provides the only
formal analysis in recent years of international lending in the presence of
default risk. Two major extensions of their analysis are made. First, we indi-
cate how the presence of default risk will induce countries to persue policies
designed to enhance creditworthiness. Second, we show that certain institu-
tional arrangements, such as debt rescheduling (often under IMF auspices), are
vehicles for reducing the social costs of default risk. The threat of default
will be shown to give rise to characteristics of international lending to LDCs
that we noted above:
1. Quantity rationing of loans;
2. LDC policies to enhance creditworthiness;
3. Shortening of the maturity structure of international lending;
4. IIVIF policies restricting loans to LDC borrowers
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The model will also help to explain another important phenomenon in
international lending: the very low frequency of debt repudiation since 1945,
compared with the frequency during the period from 1820 to World War II. As
shown in Sachs [1982], post—1945 debt crises are resolved by debt rescheduling
rather than default. We show that such an outcome is related to the aforemen-
tioned shift from bond—financing of international loans in the earlier period to
bank—financing in the current era.
The paper will develop these themes in two stages. The first section
reviews the standard theory of international lending with perfect capital
markets, and introduces the simplest two—period model of lending with default
risk. A role for the IMF in the simple model is adduced, as is an explanation
for the boom in LDC borrowing in the 19'TOs. A three—period model is then
presented, within which we may investigate the problems of debt rescheduling,
and the differing strategic interests of a country, its existing creditors, and
potential new creditors, when a rescheduling occurs. Also, the model enables us
to make statements about the use of short-term versus long—term debt in inter-
national lending.
I. The Basic Model
(a) The Competitive Framework
To highlight the role of default risk, it is worthwhile to begin with
the competitive-market view of international borrowing and lending. In that
model, domestic and world loan markets are fully integrated, so that home resi-
dents may borrow and lend freely at the world interest rate. If the home
country is large in world markets, then a rise in demand for loans at home may
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raise world interest rates, but will not drive a wedge between home and foreign
rates of return. A "small" country, of course, can borrow and lend without
affecting the world interest rate.
Even in the pure model we assume that borrowing is rationed according
to a country's intertemporal budget constraint. Without this assumption,
borrowers can borrow large amounts, and then borrow to pay off the debt, and
then borrow again ad infinitum. Even though the borrower never defaults in such
a Ponzi scheme, the lenders as a whole never get paid back. Consider the market
value, for example, of a credit line in which D(t) is lent in each period and
(1+t)D(t) is repaid in the next, where r is the safe rate of interest. The
stream of loans to time t net of repayments has present value —(1+r)—tD(t), so
that the value of the infinite sequence of loans is urn (1+r)—tD(t). In a
t +
competitive loan market, the credit line must have a value of zero, a condition
that sets the country's interternporal budget constraint.
To see this, let Q be national output, C be private consumption,
be investment, G be government spending, and Dt be the level of international
indebtedness at the end of period t, so that
(1) Dt = Dt_i + (Ct+It+Gt) — (Qt—rDt_i)
Of course, Q is GDP and Q—rD is GNP, so that Dt—Dt_1, the current account
deficit, is the difference of total absorption and GNP. Defining national
savings as GNP net of private plus public consumption expenditure, St =
(Qt.-rDt—1) — (Ct+Gt), we have the identity Dt_Dt_1 = It—St . Now, assume that
(1+r)—t Dt goes to zero as t approaches infinity. Using this limiting
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condition (1) implies
(2) (1+)-i(c+G÷I)i = (i+)-i Qj-D(O)
i=1 i=1
or
(3) (1+)-i[Qi_(c+I+G)] = : (i+p)-i(TB) = D(O)
1=1 i=1
TB signifies the trade balance, Q-C—I—G. Borrowing, D(O), cannot exceed the
discounted value of future output. The country's loan supply curve is therefore
as shown in Figure 1.
These expressions, then, describe the conditions for sustainable
domestic spending. According to (2), the discounted present value of total
future expenditures must equal the discounted present value of national output,
less initial international indebtedness. Equation (3) puts this constraint in a
slightly different perspective by recording that the discounted sum of future
trade surpluses must equal the initial indebtedness of the economy. In other
word$, trade surpluses and deficits must balance over time; the question for an
economy is not whether to run deficits, but rather when to run them.
It is by no means clear how (and whether) well—functioning financial
markets impose the limiting condition on Dt. After all, the condition is a
constraint on aggregate lending, not on a single lender at a particular moment.
Individual lenders might be willing to offer short—term loans to a borrower
pursuing an "infeasible" consumption policy, on the assumption that new lenders
will make loans in the following period that will allow the first loan to be re-
paid. Of course such a strater immediately unravels if: (1) there is a ceiling
On Dt (say because of prudential limits on bank loans), or (2) if the time hori-
zon for re—payment is finite. Foley and Helliwig [1975] consider the more dif-
ficult, infinite—horizon case without credit limits, and propose a formulation







D = Z(i+p)_tQt Total Debt, D
Figure 1. Loan Supply with No Default Risk
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strategies of competitive financial institutions. In effect, they argue that
lenders will extend credit lines, not simple loans, in the case when all other
lenders are behaving in that manner. If all other lenders make loans only when
the whole borrowing profile is feasible, then a single bank will adopt the same
criterion.
Assuming that (3) holds, the optimal timing of deficits is in general a
complex function of current and future economic variables and characteristics of
the economy. Speaking broadly, three considerations dominate with a perfect
loan market. First, households (or governments on their behalf) seek to smooth
consumption over time. A temporary drop in real income, say because of a crop
failure or an adverse shift in the terms of trade, will result in a smaller fall
in consumption, with the more steady level of consumption being supported by
foreign borrowing. Second, if the market rate of interest exceeds the social
rate of time preference, the country will tend to save today (i.e., run trade
surpluses) to enjoy higher consumption expenditures in the future. Finally, if
there are favorable investment opportunities given the world cost of capital,
countries will tend to run deficits today to finanace the investment
expenditure. There will be a tendency to equalize the marginal product of capi-
tal and the world interest rate.
When a country's trade deficit rises because of a fall in a current
income or a drop in the world interest rate, the rise in indebtedness signals a
fall in future consumption levels, as the debt must eventually be serviced. But
when a deficit emerges because of an investment boom, no future consumption
sacrifice is implied. The economy is merely trading one asset, the debt instru—
ment, for another, the claim to physical capital. Assuming that the latter
asset has a yield as high as the former (which is presumably the motive for the
investment expenditure), future consumption possibilities are enhanced, not
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diminished. For this obvious reason, measures of debt per se tell us little
about the burdens of future debt service. We must focus separately on national
savings and investment rates to determine the sustainable future paths of con-
suinption.
In a recent paper, (Sachs[1981b]), an equation for the current account
was derived under the assumption of optimizing household savings behavior and
perfect foresight. In Appendix A, we extend that equation to allow for
investment, and find that:*
(4) CA = u (Qt—Qt) — (Gt—Gt) + [(r_ô)/(1+)]Wt
(the equation assumes that households maximize L(1+ )—tlog(c) subject to the
1
intertemporal budget constraint). Thus we see that the desired current account
surplus is an increasing function of a transitory boom in incon Qt—Qt, a
decreasing function of a temporary fiscal expansion t-Gt, a decreasing func-
tion of desired investment It, and an increasing function of the gap between the
rate of return to lending and the rate of time preference.
In the case of perfect mobility, all domestic investments are under-
taken that have a positive present value at the prevailing world interest rate.
Importantly, and in sharp contrast to the case with potential default, a rise in
the domestic propensity to save (i.e. a fall in ) has no effect on domestic
investment rates, and therefore results, one—for-one, in a corresponding impro-
vement in the trade balance. We shall see that under conditions of potential
debt repudiation, a rise in savings can actually raise domestic investhent so
much that the trade balance worsens, rather than improves.
* is the share of labor in GNP; Qt is "permanent" income, defined as
r . (l+r)-tQt. ct is defined analogously. W is household wealth, which
equals [(Qt — GtP)/rJ—Dt. See appendix.
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To highlight the implausibility of this pure model, suppose that r < O.
We show in the Appendix that Wt+i = [(1+r)/(1+o)]Wt, where Wt is household
wealth, defined as.1+p)(i_t)[Qi_Ii_Gi]_D(t). Thus at t , WtO, so that
debt grows until it reaches the discounted value of future GDP! Consumption,
which is a linear function of wealth, falls to zero. Obviously, almost
regardless of the penalties for default, there will be very strong incentives to
repudiate the debt at some date in the future. Knowing this, creditors will
restrict new loans well before the Wt = 0 level is reached.
(b) Introducing Default Risk
While the limitations of the preceeding model are evident, there is no
satisfactory approach in the literature to account for default risk or credit
ceilings in the international setting. A typical theoretical approach has been
to assume that a country faces an upward sloping supply schedule for total
borrowing, with r = pff(D), f'(D)>O, where is the "safe" interest rate on
the world capital market. In an important article, Bardhan [1967] considered
optimal borrowing for a country facing such a credit supply. The country is
a monopsonist in its capital market, and thus has an incentive to pursue par-
ticular current account policies. The marginal cost of funds is r +
or r(1+.), where c is the elasticity of total lending with respect to r
Optimal policy requires that the marginal rate substitution MRS over time in
consumption, given by Ut/Ut+i and the marginal rate of transformation (MRT) in
production, given by 1 +
—v— should be equated with the marginal cost of
funds:
1(5) Ut/Ut+i = 1 +
r(1+-ç) = 1 +
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A tax on foreign borrowing, equal to t
,
will achieve (5) if the capital
markets are otherwise competitive.
Because f(D) is arbitrarily specified rather than derived, it is likely
to be a misleading guide to loan supply. Much of the rest of this section shows
the extent to which r = pl-f(D) might provide a useful formulation. There are at
least three shortcomings with the Bardhan model. First, default risk will
depend in general on factors other than D itself, e.g. the level of investment,
so that r = PFf(D,Zi,...,Zn). Policymakers will have incentives to take actions
that enhance creditworthiness, and these actions should be studied as part of an
optimal investment policy. Second, default risk will induce an absolute credit
ceiling D, at which ôf/ cO . Higher interest rates alone cannot stop a
default (if an incentive to default is there with r =
.05 it will be there with
r =
.10!). Third, since interest payments are not made when default occurs, the
marginal cost of funds is not r(1+.i-_) but (1—u) r(1+-—) where i' is the probabi-
lity that default occurs.
In a series of very insightful articles, Eaton and Gersovitz (E—G)
introduce default risk in a model of international borrowing, and show how cre-
dit ceilings may be derived. In their model, creditors respond to a default
with the permanent exclusion of the borrower from any future loans. The inabi-
lity to borrow imposes different costs on different borrowers. If the borrowing
country has (1) extensive investment opportunities; or (2) a widely fluctuating
output stream; or (3) a high rate of time preference, the costs of default will
be high. And importantly, the higher are those costs, the safer are the loans
to the borrowing country, for the smaller is the chance of default. In this
view, if the threat of exclusion from future loans imposes no costs on a
borrower, then nothing can safely be lent.
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The E—G assumptions are overly restrictive in a number of ways. First,
actual costs of default will include more than exclusion from net borrowing.
Since much of trade itself is financed with short—term credit, a defaulting
country wi.1l find it difficult to trade, much less borrow. Moreover, any
merchandise shipped abroad may be subject to confiscation or attachment by the
defaulted creditors. Second, there is no guarantee (and much evidence to the
contrary) that a defaulting country will face permanent exclusion from the loan
market. Creditors will have an incentive to make settlements for the partial
re-payment of debt after a default occurs, and to then resume lending. New len-
ders may be undetered from entering into loans with a defaulting country under
some circumstances. Third, even when the incentives to default are strong,
borrowers and lenders may negotiate more efficient forms of debt relief for
over—extended borrowers, such as debt rescheduling. Fourth, E—G do not
distinguish between the investment versus consumption behavior of the borrowing
country. We shall see that the borrower's propensity to invest is a fundamental
determinant of its ability to attract international capital.
To introduce these new features, let us begin with a two—period model
of international borrowing, in which loans are made to a sovereign borrower in
one period that may or may not be paid back in the next. Credit market
equilibrium requires that the expected return of lending equal the safe rate
of interest. If the loan is defaulted the creditors can retaliate, with a cost
to the debtor country of a fraction A of national product. This fraction A
summarizes all of the possible costs of retaliation: trade disruption, seizure
of assets, exclusion from future borrowing, etc. Importantly, we assume that
the retaliation yields no utility to the creditors (or that the costs and bene-
fits of retaliation cancel), but only a loss to the debtor country.
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With these assumptions, the two—period budget constraint for the
country is:
(6) Cj=Q1+D1—11
C2 = Max (C21),C2N)
where
C2D = (1—A)Q2(Il,E2)
= Q2(11,E2) — (1+r)D1
E2 is a random shock affecting second—period income; C2D is the second—period
consumption if default occurs, and C2N is the amount if default does not occur.
Actual consumption in the second period is the maximum of C2D and C2N.
To determine loan supply to the country, we must first specify how C1,
C2, and Ii are determined. In the present version, a social planner maximizes
EU(C1,C2) subject to (6). More realistically we might separate the public and
private sectors, and allow the government to choose 11G, D1 , T1 , T2 and the pri-
vate sector to select C1 , C2, I1 subject to the public—sector actions, (11G is
government investment, and T are taxes). This alternative formulation will be
pursued in future work.
Finally, there are two choices with respect to the timing of the loans:
that Dj is set before or after Ii is chosen. We will term the latter case a
precommitment equilibrium, since the country can pre—commit itself to an invest-
ment policy in the first period, (and will have a strong incentive to do so if
it can).
An illustration will motivate the general solution of this simple
model. Suppose u(c1,c2) = C1 + , Q2 = Qi+(1+)1i , and p < < ô , (where
p is the safe rate of interest in the world market). Investment opportunities
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are limited by I 3so let C2 = max (C2D,C2N) . In a model without
default risk (denoted by superscript S ), the equilibrium is:
('i)
C1S = Qi + Q2S/(l+P)
c2s = o
D1S = (Qi — — 11S)
All investment opportunities are exploited since > p , and all consumption is
shifted forward in time, since ó > P . This equilibrium is clearly not
sustainable if default risk is present, since a second—period default would
allow consumption in the amount C2D = (1.A)Q2 which is greater than zero (i.e.
default dominates repayment for any A < 1 ).
Allowing for default risk, we first examine the case where no invest-
ment precommitrnent is possible. The creditors lend the amount Dj
,
and then
the social planner chooses optimal C1,11 for the given D1 . Hence, there is
an implicit relationship Ii = Ii(Di) . Since the creditors know this, the
ceiling on loans is given by another implicit relationship:
(8) D1 (i + ) [Q2(Il (D1))] = 1IQi + (i +)Ii (D1 )]
We solve first the planner's problem:
C2
(9). maxCi +___
C1 = Qi + Di — Ii
C2 = Q2 — (i+p)D1
Q2 = Qi +
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Clearly Ii = 0 , since -1 + < 0 . Therefore, by (8), the credit
ceiling is Dj ' i/(1+p) and the full equilibrium (with superscript N ) is:




Utility is reduced below the level of the no—default case, since profitable Ii
is not undertaken and consumption is not optimally shifted over time. Since the
8conomy is rationed, the net shadow price on loans is 6 , and not r , and
since 6 > i.i , the investment projects cannot meet the more stringent standard.
The situation may be quite different with investment precommitments.
Now the planner solves (9) plus the added constraint D1 A[Q2(11)] . By
manipulating Ij , the debt ceiling may be raised. Thus, from (9) we see:
(i+L') (1+p) dD1(ii) dU/dI = —1 + (io) + (1 — (1+61J j--
The incremental investment serves two purposes: raising second—period output and
(1 + p)raising the nation's borrowing capacity. [i - (i+o)] measures the welfare gain
of an added unit of debt. From the borrowing constraint, dD1/d11 = ______
Thus,
dU




The pre—commitment equilibrium is therefore (signified by superscript P ):
(12) I1P = 0 (ö.-p)A(1+i) < (ô_)(i+p)
= T (ó-p).(1+) > (Ô-i)(i+p)
C1P = Qi + Dl — ll
C2 = (1—A)Q2P
= Qi + (1+)11P
Di = )Q2P/(l+p)
It should be clear that US > UN 1S 1P ) N (with at least
one equality binding), and C1S > 01P
Table 1 shows the first—order conditions for the general two—period
model under certainty, in the three cases under study. In the two cases with
default risk we find:
(a) The MRS, U1/J2
,
exceeds the world interest rate, as does the
marginal product of capital;
(b) Utility is a strictly increasing function of A , the default
penalty, until the point where the debt constraint is no longer
binding;
(c) Investment rates are ordered 1S ? 1P
Thus, under certainty, borrowing countries would prefer large default penalties,
as the way to free up the loan constraint. Note importantly that with an invest—
U1
ment precommitment, ------ should be reduced below — , since the shadow returns
dli UC2
to investment include not only the direct gain but also the indirect gains
from relaxation of the borrowing limit. This optimal divergence of MRS and MRT
calls for a subsidy to savings or domestic investment.
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Table 1
uilibrium Conditions in the Two-Period Model
No Default Risk
C1 = Qi + Dl — Ii
C2 = Q2 — (l+p)D1
Uci
--= (i+p) ; —= (i+p)
C1 Q ; C2 O
Default Risk with Pre_Colnxnitment*
C1 = Qi + Dl — Ii
C2 Q2 — (1+p)Di






C1 O ; C2 O
Default Risk without Pre_Colnmitment*






(i+e) ; — (i+U) ; (1+e) > (i+)
Ci O ; C2 O
* The conditions shown are for the case in which the borrowing constraint
Di Q2/(1+P) is binding. If the constraint is not binding, the solution is
identical to the case of no default risk.
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Consider, now, two extensions to this basic framework: initial indeb-
tedness, and bargaining between the debtor and creditors. Suppose that the
country enters period 1 "endowed" with long—term debt (1+p)D0 due in the second
period (presumably from a past history of borrowing). It is possible that
(1+p)D0 is so high that default is ensured in the second period for any non-
negative level of new debt commitments D1 . Even more importantly, it is
possible that (1+p)D0 is high enough to generate default in the case without
pre—commitment, but not in the case with pre—commitment. If a mechanism can
then be found to allow precominitment, the default can be avoided.
In the linear case without pre—conunitment, for example, default will
occur if (1+p)D0 > Qi No new loans will be available in the first period,
and the country will renege on its debt in the second. With pre—cornmitrnent, and
assuming that the investment criterion --" is satisfied, default will occur only
when(1+p)D0exceeds[(2+p)/(1+p)]1 +(1+)l(1+p)l[A(1÷)(à_p)+
which is itself greater than . A high—conditionality IMF loan
may be a mechanism to allow the country to precommit to the appropriate invest-
ment strategy.
A second extension involves the treatment of default. In the present
formulation, the borrower compares the second-period interest payment
(1+p)D1 with the penalty , and defaults if and only if (1+p) D1 > 1Qi
This representation may be faulty from two points of view. When the debt repayment
is high, but less than X
, we might suppose that the borrower has bargaining
power vie-a-vis the creditors, and can achieve some partial debt relief. After
all, the net cost of default is — (1+p)Di for the debtor, but (1-f-P)D1
for the creditor; as long as (1+p)D1 a threat of default by the debtor
should be credible. On the other side, when (1+P)D1 exceeds )Q.j , we might
also suppose that the banks and country will reach a compromise, for default is
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clearly pareto inefficient (due to the creditors' retaliation). For example,
the country is indifferent between defaulting (and suffering retaliation 2 ),
and paying back Q2 of debt with no penalty or retaliation imposed. The cre-
ditor would clearly prefer this option, (i.e. a partial debt moratorium of the
amount (l+p)D1 — 2 ), than total default.
The actual equilibrium that is reached will depend importantly on the
feasibility of post bargaining between the borrower and creditors. And this
feasibility will depend, in turn, on the degree of market concentration of the
borrowers. Bulow and Shoven [1978] among others have differentiated between a
"bond" market and a "bank" market, with bargaining over debt relief feasible
only in the latter case. We will follow Bulow and Shoven in assuming that "the
bondholders are a non—cohesive group of investors who have a fixed time pattern
of claims.... Their non—cohesive nature implies that they cannot negotiate to
alter the terms of their loan when bankruptcy becomes a possibility". (pp.
438—439). Banks, contrariwise, are able to renegotiate. The problem with
bond-holder negotiations is more than logistical. There are also free—rider
problems which give each borrower the incentive to demand full repayment,
knowing that the remaining creditors will still have a strong incentive to pre-
vent default. In Sacha [1982] it is shown that the bank vs. bond market dicho-
tomy is historically relevant. Pre—1930 borrowing was principally through bond
flotation, with little negotiation between creditors and debtors during a debt
crisis; the post—1945 lending is mainly via syndicated bank loans, with signifi-
cant creditor—debtor negotiation.
We will suppose that D1(1+p) > Q2 will lead to default cuni retaliation
with bond lending. In a bank market, we might suppose that the banks and
country bargain in the second period, and reach an efficient outcome (and that
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such bargaining is anticipated in the first period). In the simplest extension,
we might suppose that banks offer partial debt relief, by demanding repayment of
Q2, and agreeing to no further retaliation against the debtor. If this offer
can be made credibly on a "take—it—or—leave—it" basis, then the country will
accept it, and the bank will extract the maximum feasible payment from the
country. As an alternative we might suppose that the outcome is the Nash
bargaining solution, where full default and full retaliation are the threat
points of the country and creditors respectively.
Under the Nash model, the actual repayment R will be derived as:
(13) max u(Q2—R) — u[ (i — A)Q2] J• R—O)
R (i +
Using (13) we can derive R as a function of (1+P)Di . For small levels of
debt, all is repaid. At a critical point, a maximum repayment is reached.
For (1+p)Di greater than this level, only RM is repaid, and the rest is
forgiven by the creditor without further penalty to country. As is well known
from bargaining theory, the more risk—averse is the country, according to u(s),
the larger will be the critical point.
In the linear case, we have H = max [(2-R)R] , with the solution:
H '(1 +p)D
(14) R = (1+p)D1 for (1+p)D1 2/2
1i = 2/2 for (1+p)D1 > 2/2
Now, if banks understand that the second-period repayments will be determined by
(14), they will lend up to the point D1 = )2/[2(1+P)] , rather than to the
higher level Q2/(1+p) as posited earlier. Thus, the Nash model allows us to
derive a loan schedule that is similar to the more rudimentary schedule derived
earlier, but is in fact more restrictive.
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(c) A Digression on Corporate Default
There are a number of important similarities and differences between
the cases of corporate default and sovereign default. Most importantly, the
decision to default is based on differing criteria in the two cases, and the
income streams of the creditors and debtors following a default are different.
But in many ways, the problems of time-inconsistency of investment plans, and
the value of investment pre-commitments carry over to corporate borrowing.
Broadly speaking, a corporate default brings about bankruptcy, in which
the claim to the future income of the firm is transferred from the debtor to its
creditors. The equity—holders of the firm will only choose bankruptcy when the
indebtedness exceeds the value of the future income stream, i.e. when the net
worth is negative (this is a necessary but not sufficient condition; see Bulow
and Shoven). When backruptcy occurs, the creditors receive the value of that
income stream net of any bankruptcy costs (denoted B). In the two period set-
up, bankruptcy will only occur if (1+r) D1 > Q2. The creditors receive Q2—B,
and the debtors receive nothing. In analor to the case of debt relief with
sovereign borrowers, the creditors may have an incentive to renegotiate credit
terms to avoid bankruptcy if B is large relative to renegotiation costs.
A corporate default decision is typically less volitional than a
sovereign default. A government is rarely constrained to default. The resour-
ces are typically available to pay off the creditors, though the government
deems the costs of repayment greater than the penalties of default. A cor-
poration may well be insolvent as well as having negative net worth, so that it
is simply unable to discharge its obligations. But at a deeper level, a cor-
poration like a government constantly chooses policies that make a future
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default more or less likely. And as with a sovereign borrower, a firm can often
raise Its market value if it can pre—commit itself to certain policies that
reduce the probability of future bankruptcy.
The corporate finance literature has indentified a number of ways that
a firm may behave to transfer income from bondholders to equityholders by
raising the likelihood of default (see for example Jensen and Meckling [1976],
Smith and Warner [1979], Grossman and Hart [1980]). Like the government
borrower, a firm may use the proceeds of loans to pay dividends, rather to
invest. In the limit it may liquidate its assets to pay dividends, leaving the
creditors with claims to an empty shell. (Later, we describe other actions that
both firms and sovereign borrowers may undertake to reduce the value of the
creditor's claim, including "claim dilutiontt, and over—risky investment). In
the two—period example, a firm might distribute (1+r)D1+Q1 in first—period divi-
dends, and default in the second period (assuming (1+r)D1 > Q2), rather than
undertake investment projects with internal rate of return greater than r. If
creditors expect such behavior, they will restrict lending. As with the LDC
debtor the firm is best off ex ante if it can guarantee that it won't pursue
such strategies.
In the case of corporate borrowing bond covenants are available to
restrict the borrower from undertaking specified actions after a debt is
incurred. Smith and Warner [1979] provide an excellent survey of such
covenants, which indicates how they directly and indirectly enforce an efficient
borrowing and investment plan by corporate borrowers. These covenants often
directly restrict dividend payments, which may be tantamount to requiring the
firm to invest rather than "consume" its loans. Other types of provisions
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include: restrictions on new debt issues, maintenance of the firm's existing
assets, financial disclosure requirements, and restrictions on merger activity.
Sucb provisions are unenforceable with foreign sovereign borrowers, and
thus are not a part of the typical international syndicated loan agreements. It
is the absence of such provisions, as much as the inability to seize assets in
the event of default that makes rationing a far more prevalent feature of the
international capital markets.
(d) Default Risk under Uncertainty
The introduction of uncertainty adds importantly to the conclusions of
the previous section. In the previous model, the threat of default generated
credit ceilings but no actual default or debt moratorium. Also the loan sche-
dule was kinked, but nowhere upward sloping. Moreover, a rise in the penalty
for default was necessarily welfare improving for the debtor. All of these
conclusions are now modified. With uncertainty, defaults (or debt relief in the
renegotiation case) will occur; the supply schedule of loans will slope upward,
with rising risk premia measuring the risk of default; and rising penalties for
default can now actually make the debtor worse off.
Again, it is useful to begin with an illustration. Suppose that we
remain in the linear case, with Q2 = Q + (1+i)I , where Q is distributed
uniformalLy over [°,Qi] . We consider two outcomes for debt repayment,
depending on whether or not there is ex post renegotiation (i.e. whether the
loans are "bank" loans or "bond" loans). In either case, the creditor is fully
paid off when (1+r)D1 < AQ2. Without renegotiation, the creditor receives zero
when (1 +r)Di > A Q2; with renegotiation, we assume that the creditor extracts the
payment AQ2. In both cases, the country consumes Q2-(1+r)D1 when (1+r)Di
AQ2, and (1—A)Q2 when (1+r)Di > AQ2.
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Let i be the probability of (partial or total) default, so that " =
pr[AQ2 < (1+r)D1] = pr[ç< (1+r)D1/A— (1+Ii)11]. We denote Q* as the default
threshold; when Q2 < Qt the debtor defaults. Clearly, Q* = (1+r)D1/A, and
= Pr[Q < Q]. Also, for all variables X, we will use E(X I D) and E(X I ND) to
signify the expectation of X conditional on default (D) and no default (ND)
respectively. With risk neutral creditors, the expected return on D1 must equal
the safe rate of return, p. With no renegotiation this requires
—Di + (1—r)(1+r)D1/(l+p) = 0; with renegotiation, market equilibrium requires
—Dl + (i—Tr)(1+r)D1/(l+p) + lrE(AQ2 D)/(1+p) = 0. Specifically:
(15) (1+r) = (1+p)/(1—ir) without renegotiation
(i+r) = (1+p)/(1—n) — ir E(A Q2 I D)/[(1_11)Dl] with renegotiation
Combining (is) with the definition of r and the production function
for Q2, we may derive supply schedules for loans, in which (1+r) is an
increasing function of D1/Q1 and a decreasing function of 11/Q1. Under the two
cases. of bond and bank loans we find:
(16) (a) without renegotiation:
(1+r) = (l+p) 0 < D1/Q1 < dmifl
(1+r) = F(D1/Qi,Ii/Qi) dmifl Di/Qi ( umax
—
[i+ (1+1)I1/Q1] _1.(1+p)(dmax_ D1/Q1)/AF
2(D1/AQ1)
dmifl = A (1+)(I1/Q1)/(1+p)
umax = A[1 + (1+)(I1/Q1)]2/4(1+p)
—26—
(b) With renegotiation
(1+r) = (1+p) 0 < Di/Qi <
(1+r) = G(Dl/Ql,Il/Ql) Dinin Dl/Ql cmax
G
1 + \!2(1+p)/A(dmax - Di/Qi)
2(D1/ AQ1)
Ixnifl =
A 2112ax 2(1 + [i + (1 + ) () ]
Graphs of these functions F and G are shown in Figure 2 (drawn for a given
'l/Qi). In each case the supply of funds is initially perfectly elastic, then
upward sloping, and finally perfectly inelastic once a maximum is reached. Note
that G < F for all Dj, and that max > dmax. Thus, the possibility of re-
negotiation shifts the loan supply schedule outward and as we will see, raises
the expected utility of the debtor. Note also that a rise in Ii shifts the loan
schedule to the right, as illustrated.
Now let us consider the optimal borrowing strate of the country.
Expected utility, or C1 + E(C2)/(l+ o) is maximized subject to:
(17) (a) Cl = Qi — + D
(b) C2 = max (C2D,02N)
(c) C2D = (1—)Q2
(d) C2N Q2 — (1+r)Di
(e) Q2 = Q+ (1+i)I1
(f) Q is uniform on [o,Ql]
(g) (1+r) as in (16)
(h) n Pr [ Q2 < (i +r)D1]
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Since EU = Ci + (i+ô)—1 E(C2 jD) • + (1+6)—i E(c2 NT)) . (i—),
we can write, after some manipulation:
(18) EU = (Qi — + Di) + (i+ó)—i [E(Q2) — (i+p)D1 —A 1TE(Q2 ID)]
with no renegotiation
EU (Qi — Ii + Dl) + (i+o)—1 [E(Q2) — (1+P)Di]
with renegotiation
Since renegotiation allows the creditors and debtors to reach an efficient
outcome, EU is higher in that case. The country pays a lower risk premium on
its loans, which yields the welfare benefit (i +
—1 A ii E(Q2 I D).
Let us now study how the optimal borrowing differs between the bank-
loan and bond-loan models. In both cases, a loan yields D1
with expected re-payment to the bank of (1+p)D1 in the next
loan (i.e. no renegotiation) the country may also suffer an
_____
that is not received by the bank. Since the probability of
the expected value of the penalty is —IT AE(Q2 I D). In the
payment AQ2 is made to the bank instead of default, and so
bank's expected yield (1+p)D1 (and not something additional
a bank loan, EU D1 —(i+p)(i+à)—l D1 + (other terms), and the country chooses
to maximize D1. With a bond loan, EU D1 —(i + (1 + a)—i Di —
A irE(Q2 D)(i+ ô)—1 , and it is optimal to borrow Dj < dmax.
country borrows Dj = Dmax, we have (1 +r) 2(1 + Q/[i +(i +
Thus, borrowing is shown as point A in Figure 2.
in the first period,
period. With a bond
extra penalty AQ2
this penalty is iT
bank-loan model, the
is part of the
to it). Thus, with
Note that when the
(I1/Qi)2], from (16).
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Let us turn next to the bond—market equilibrium, in which no renego-
tiation occurs. As usual we must distinguish the cases with and without an
investment precommitment. Assuming no preconunitment it is obvious that no
investment will be undertaken, as long as 11 < Thus, EU becomes
lii
+ 1j(i+)JQ1 + [(6-.p)/(1+ó)]D1 — An2[Q1/2(i+ä)], where we make use of the
fact that E(Q2 ID) equals _!_ + (i+i.)Ii. The optimum borrowing is set
according to the condition (-p)/(1+) = [Aii/(i+6)] . With a little
manipulation we find that this condition can also be written as
(19) (1+6)—i (1—it) [(i+r)Di] = 1
The analor of (19) with the monopsonists' condition under certainty, in
equation (5), is obvious. With default risk, the borrower equates the expected
marginal cost of funds with the marginal benefit. The expected marginal cost is
j-_ [(i+r)D] multiplied by the probability that interest will in fact be paid,
(i—it) . The expected benefit is simply U01/U2 , which in the linear case is
(i+6) . As we show shortly, the condition (i—n) ---- [(i+r)Di] = U1/E(U2 I ND)
will hold in a more general setting.
To complete the solution, we find — . Since (i—ir)(1+r) = (i+p)
and it = (i+r)D1/)1 , we see that dlT/dD = (i+p)/[ )1(i—2u)] , so that the
optimum borrowing rule implies:
(20) iT = (6..p)/(1+26_p)
(i+r) = (i+26_p)(l+p)/(l+6)
= i( o_p)(i-i-o)/[(i+p)(1-i-26_p)2]
Optimal borrowing is shown as point B in Figure 2. Note that the optimal iT is
not affected by A , the penalty for default! This is because higher A raises
the costs of default but also the limits for borrowing. Since D1 is linear in
A , iT ( = i:!:: (D1/A) ) is independent of A
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In the case with investment pre-commitment, it may pay to invest in
I through li , since higher I raises borrowing limits and lowers
borrowing costs. Consider the case without renegotiation. The borrower's
problem is:
(21) max C1 + E(C2)/(1+)
C2 = max (C2D,C2N)
C2D = (1—A)Q2
C2N = Q2 — (1+r)D1
Q2 = Q+ (li-p)I1
(1+r)(1—ir) = (1+p)
= pr[ > Di(1+r)]
By earlier methods we find that the gains to investment are:
dEU dD1(22)
--j—— = —1 + (1+p)(1+ä)l — A (1+i)(1--i)i + i+S
Again, as in (ii), the borrower compares the costs of investment, —1, with the
benefits, discounted at the rate of time preference. The benefits are: the
expected marginal product, which is ii (1+i) + (1—IT) (1—A) (1+i)
[ = (in.') — Arr(i+i.')]
, plus the increase in borrowing due to higher investment
dD1times the welfare gain of borrowing (i . With some tedious cal—
dD 1
culations it is straightfoward to find
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An expression for the optimal default probability in terms of
dEU
Iiis easily derived, by setting = 0 for given /Q1 . The resulting
expression is:
(2 ) - - (i+)(1+à)(Ii/Qi)(1 + 26- p)
Higher pre-commitments of I reduce the optimal default probability for the
borrower.
It is easy to extend these results to a more general setting. Consider
the choice of C1 ,D1, and in the non—linear case with no renegotiation,
ignoring investment for expositional ease. Expected utility EU is given by
Q*(24) EU = u(c1) + (1+6)—i u[(1—A)Q2] f(Q2)dQ2
+ (1+6)—i JQ* U[Q2—(l+r)Dl] f(Q2)dQ2
Q* is the cutoff point for default, which occurs when Q2 < Q*. EU is maximized
over D1 and Q*1 subject to the constraint that C1 Q1 + D1 . At the optimum,
dEU





= Ucl/E(UC2 I ND)
ihere E(UC2 I ND) = (1+6)-i (1w) )Q* U'[Q2-(i+r)D1] f(Q2)dQ2,
and (1TT) =
.)Q* f(Q2)dQ2 Equation (25) is the modified Bardhan equation
noted earlier.
—32—
II. The Three—Period Model
(a) Introduction
Adding a third period to the previous model allows for a large number
of further considerations. First, the three—period model helps to emphasize the
relationship between investment and credit ceilings. We saw in the two—period
model that only a strong pre—cominitment may lead the bank to make a loan related
to an investment program that a country would be a jriori, but not a osteriori,
ready to make. In a multiperiod model the situation is modified because the
renewal of credit is now a function of investments undertaken by the country.
Thus, the multiperiod horizon makes an efficient investment program more likely.
This feature is akin to the game—theoretic conclusion that repeated gaines allow
non—cooperative agents to reach cooperative outcomes.
Second, in a three-period model we may study the determination of loan
maturities, i.e., the relative use of short—term and long—term debt. The
problem of debt maturity is significantly different in the cases of corporate
and government borrowing. As is well known from finance theory, long—term cre-
ditors always stand at risk that the borrower will float additional debt, thus
raising the probability of default and in effect diluting the original
creditors' claim on the firm. Without protection against this additional debt,
the original creditors will demand an interest rate premium that capitalizes the
future risks of more borrowing. In a domestic capital market, these extra costs
can be avoided and the firm's market value raised by two devices, bond covenants
proscribing future borrowing or seniority provisions. These do not exist in the
international setting, because in the event of default they would be difficult
or impossible to enforce.
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Thus, we come up against a second example of time inconsistency. We
shall note that the sovereign borrower will choose to over—borrow in the second
period relative to the level that would be specified in an optimal bond cove-
narit. Part of this over—borrowing will be avoided at the expense of a different
cost: an excess reliance on short—term loans, at variable interest rates.
A third issue that is raised in the three-period model is the question
of debt rescheduling. When the second—period results make default profitable to
the borrowing country, the existing lenders have an incentive to propose a
rescheduling of debt that will delay the default (and possibly, if third—period
results are good enough, prevent it). In a bond market it may be impossible to
arrange this rescheduling, but in a bank market the outcome is feasible and is
in fact observed. We shall see that, unless the old lenders stand ready to
offer explicit debt cancellation, some monitoring of the rescheduling will help
the lenders to minimize their losses. We shall see, in effect, that by pre-
venting free entry to new lenders, the older lenders can optimize their pay-off.
From a first—period point of view, the borrowing countries will prefer to pre—
commit themselves to such monitoring; this is why they will desire, in general,
to belong to such institutions as the IMP that will stand ready to monitor the
rescheduling. Once it has been granted, the borrowing country will be prevented
by the IMF from borrowing freely, even though the desired borrowing would be
forthcoming from new creditors. Once the possibility of rescheduling in lieu of
default is taken into account, the expected value of lending is raised, with a
consequent shift in the supply curves of credit. In such circumstances, we
shall see that a risk—neutral borrow will be enabled to raise its borrowing up
to a point where the probability that such rescheduling will occur is also
raised.
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Once again, we turn first to the linear case under certainty, but now
in three periods. The planner maximizes C1 + C2/(i+o) + C3/(1+ó)2 , subject
to:
C1
= Qi + D12 + D13 — 112 — 113
(26) c2 = Q2 + D23 — 123 — D12(l+p) + 112(1+ LI12)
C3 = Q3 — D13(1+p)2 — D13(1+p) + 113(1+LA13) + I23(1+I.3)
— D12 is the short—term loan made at period 1 (and due at period 2)
— D13 is the long—term loan made at period 1 (and due at period 3),
— D23 is the short—term loan made at period 2.
112 , 113 and 123 are the investments, with the indexes having the same
meaning as for the loans. ( i , , L3 ) are the net rates of return.
( Cj , Q ) i = 1,2,3 represent consumption and production.
The planner's solution requires a backward optimization: if we seek
a time—consistent solution (as we shall), we must ask: once and D13
have been lent, what will be the maximum loan D23 the second—period lenders will be
ready to offer? Knowing this as a function of D12 and D13 , one may
look for the optimal choice of D12 and D13 . D23 will be determined so that
(27) 4Q3 + 113(1+LI,3) + I23(1+L3)] = D13(1+p)2+ D23(1+p)
if the banking system, at period 2, can be guaranteed that 123 will be under-
taken. Assuming L3 < ô , and without monitoring, we know from the two—period
model that 123 = 0 . Therefore
(28) D23 =
-Di3(1+p) + [Q3 + I13(1+LI3)]
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Now D12 will be determined in such way as to prevent default at beginning of
period two. That is
(29) A [Q2 + 112(1 + 2)] [ + 113(1 + 3)] 2(1 + - D23]
+ 4- [(i+ + D13(1+p)2]
From equation (28), this becomes:
(30) D12(1+p) — D23 A + I12(1+2)]
That is
(31) D12 + D13 1+P EQ2+I12(1+2)] + (i+)2 + I13(1+3)]
The utility level of the borrowing country is
(32) U = (Qi + D12 + D13 - 112 - 113) + U2a
where U2a is the autarky (i.e. post—default) utility level over period 2 and 3,
( U2a = (1-A)[Q2 + (1+2)I12] + + (1+3)I13] ). The country optimi-
zes by borrowing until the constraint in (31) is reached. From (31) and (32) we
see that the country is indifferent between short— and long-term debt in this
case.
From earlier arguments we know that 112 will only be undertaken
if 112 > 6 . On the other hand 113 will raise D23 , and therefore
D12 + D13 . When 113 is undertaken, the utility is
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= (i + )2 113(1 + 3) - 113 + (1 + )2 (1- A) 113(1 + 3) + c
where C is a constant that does not depend on 113
• Therefore, the condition
for 113 to be undertaken is
(i+)2
- 1 [1+1p)2 - 1+3)
Therefore, even if (1+3) < (1+12)(1+3)
, 113 may be undertaken while 112
and 123 are set to zero.
Thus, 113 is undertaken if the enhancement in creditworthiness is suf-
ficient to warrant postponement of consumption. Since long-term investments but
not short—term investments raise creditworthiness, the country will not
necessarily undertake the most efficient set of investment programs.
(b) Uncertainty in the Three—Period Model
Once uncertainty is introduced into the three—period model, so that the
possibility of default is present, we may arrive at a much richer theory of debt
maturity and debt re-scheduling. Under certainty, the borrower is indifferent
between short and long—term bonds, while with uncertainty an optimal portfolio
must be selected with the two assets. In a default—free world, there are fun—
damental diversification motives that guide the choice of borrowing maturity.
If future short—term rates are uncertain, long-term borrowing
may provide a
hedge against adverse shifts in borrowing costs. Alternatively, unexpected
changes in short—term rates in the future might be correlated with other shifts,
such as terms—of--trade or output fluctuations, so that a sequence of short—term
loans (rather than a long—term loan) might provide a useful hedge.
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Once default risk is introduced, though, another consideration raises
the cost of long—term borrowing: the threat to the long-term creditors of
further borrowing by the debtor while the long—term loan is in effect. From an
ex ante point of view, the borrower would choose to limit further borrowing,
ex post; once the long—term interest rates are sealed, he will have a strong
incentive to borrow again.
In the following example, we display a situation in which expected uti-
lity can be maximized by a continuum of choices of short—term versus long-term
borrowing, but in which D13 must be set equal to zero to reach the optimum in a
time—consistent way. In other words, borrowing strategies (D12*, D13* (>0)
D23*) and (D12, D13, = 0, D23) might both be optimal, but only the latter is
time consistent. If the country borrows D12*, D13* in the first period it will
choose D23 1 D23* in the second period, unless it can be forced (e.g. by a bond
covenant, or bank rationing, or the IMF) to choose D23*. The problem is that
the country will always find it opportune to over—borrow in the second period,
and thus dilute the long—term creditors' claim.
Consider the following illustration. Let U(C1,c2,c3) = u(c1) +
U(C2)/(1+'5) + U(C3)/(1+o)2, with output Qi and Q2 known, and Q3 randomly distri-
buted with p.d.f. f(Q3)dQ3. As in the previous sections:'
(.) = Qi + D12 + Di3
C2 = Q2 — (1+p)D12 — r13 D13 + D23
C3 = max (C3D, C3N)
C3D = (1—X)Q3 ; 3N = Q3 — (1+r13)D13 — (1+r23)D23
(1+r13) = (1+p)(2+P)/(2+P _ir) ; (1+r23) = (i+p)/(l—n)
iT = Pr [ )Q3 < (1 +rl 3)Di 3 + (1 +r23)D23]
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Now we maximize EU subject to D12,
D13, and D23.
One fact is readily apparent: The optimum is defined only up to a
linear combination of the debt levels. To see this, consider an optimum at
D12*, D13*, and D23*. If D12* is now reduced by C, D13* raised by C, and
D23* reduced by c (l+p — r13), it is easy to check that:
(1) consumption levels remain unchanged; and
(2) the bond-market equilibrium conditions on r13 and r3 continue
to hold.I
In particular, the country may reach the optimum without using any
long—term debt, and the optimal is independent of the level of D13 that is in
fact selected.
To find the global optimum, we differentiate EU with respect to
D23, and D13. The first-order conditions for D12 and D23 are:
(35) (a) U1 = U2 . [(1+p)/(1+à)]





To evaluate (37)(c), note that ii F[(1+r13)D13 + (1+r23)D23] where F
is the cumulative density function of . Since r13 and r3 depend on it,
higher D23 raises both r13 and r3. Specifics are left to a footnote.IU
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Now, consider the time—consistent policy in which D23 is selected con-
ditional on a pre—determined (1+r13)D13. In the second period the first—order
condition is:




Since (1+r13) is given, the borrower does not consider the effect of
D23 on r13 as in (35)(c). Of course the original lender is aware of (35), and
so sets r13 according to the time—consistent borrowing rule.
Clearly (36) is optimal only if (i+p) = (i+), or precisely, if D13 =
0. Otherwise, (1+p) < (i+), so that U02 is too low relative to UC3 and over—
borrowing occurs.
In this simple illustration there are no incentives to set D13 greater
than zero, since the first—best option can be reached with no long—term debt.
If the model were slightly expanded, however, the first—best option might well
require D13 > 0. Such a case will arise, for example, if a risk-averse borrower
faces an uncertain safe interest rate P23 in the second period. Then, the gains
from D13 must be balanced against the costs of overborrowing in the second
period in deciding upon the level of long—term indebtedness.
Corporate borrowing in a domestic capital market is subject to similar
incentive problems, though the corporation's incentive to finance with short
versus long—term debt is not as easy to adduce. In any event, debt seniority
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provisions and bond covenants with restrictions on new borrowing may be suf-
ficient to overcome the time—inconsistency problem. Smith and Warner [1979, p.
136] discuss a number of forms that the covenants may take, including: (1) no
restrictions on the stockholders' rights to issue new debt; (2) dollar
limitations on new debt issues; (3) minimum prescribed ratios between assets
and debt.
(c) Debt Rescheduling
We remarked earlier that bond-holders and bank creditors are likely to
behave differently as the threat of default rises, with the latter offering
terms for renegotiation to avoid the inefficiencies of default cum retaliation.
In a three—period framework it is easy to discuss the renegotiation process, and
to introduce a theory of debt re—scheduling. For this purpose we introduce
technological uncertainty in the second, as well as the last period. If the
second—period outcome is sufficiently poor, the country will reach the point
where the benefits from default exceed the expected costs. In a bond—market,
the country will simply default on its debt; we will assume that it cannot sub-
sequently borrow D23 > 0 in the event of default in the second period. With
bank creditors, the options are greater. The banks may partially cancel the
debt, or they may reschedule the debt, or they may stop loaning, and face the
consequences of default. We now explore this set of options.
The motivation to reschedule is clear. Suppose that second-period
income is so low that default has higher expected
utility than repayment cum
optimal new borrowing. If the country defaults, it will
consume C2 = (1_A)Q2
and C3 (1—A)Q3, assuming creditor retaliation. The banks, of course, would
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receive nothing. Alternatively, the banks could demand at least partial
repayment of the debt, that would leave the country at least as well off as in
default. Clearly the banks could demand at least A Q2 in repayment, in return
for not retaliating against the debtor country. And indeed they may be able to
demand more. We will see that the process can work in one of two ways: simple
cancellation of part of the outstanding debt, or rescheduling, in which the
country is "loaned" much of the money to re—pay the debt coming due. These
loans are necessarily at below market interest rates, and thus would only be
offered by existing creditors trying to retrieve part of their original invest-
ment by keeping the country afloat.
To formalize, suppose that (1+r12)Dl2 is due in the second period. And
suppose further that debt repayment plus new borrowing has lower expected uti-
lity than default. In a bond market, the country defaults, and the bondholders
receive nothing. Banks have two options. First, they may simply cancel part of
the debt, C2, so that the country repays (1+r12)D12 — C2, and then borrows
freely for the third period, with no strings attached. Alternatively, the banks
may "loan" L2, demanding repayment (1+r3)L2 in the next period (superscript R
denotes "with rescheduling"). In the third period the banks will actually
receive mm [AQ3,(1+r3)L2]. Using this rescheduling approach, the bank does
not write—off any of the debt in the second period, as it does if it cancels C2.
Note that the loan L2 must be made at a rate below the market rate. We know
this because we have assumed that the country would rather default than repay
loans and borrow again at the market rate. Only existing creditors, therefore,
will offer L2 at rate (1+r3).
The re-scheduling scheme has a potential problem, however, if new len-
ders enter in the second period. A marginal lender, not part of the original
loan D12, can free—ride on the major creditors. The new lender knows that old
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creditors will have an incentive to prevent a default on the new loans, if the
new lender can "spoil" the re—scheduling by triggering a default if not fully
repaid. Thus, if new loans at rate (1+p) are made, the repayments on the
rescheduled debt will be reduced to mm [ A Q3 — L(i+), L2(1+r3)]. The new
borrower will extract part of the repayment stream from the old creditors. This
is an extreme version of the dilution problem of the previous section. Here,
the different classes of lenders recognize their different strategic positions.
As in the earlier section, the country itself would choose, ex ante, to forego
such dilution if it can. In actual reschedulings, small borrowers often use
such power against the large creditors. Banks with small claims often demand
full repayment of debt, forcing the large banks to buy out the debt in order to
forestall a default.
One mechanism for reducing the dilution problem has been for the
rescheduling country to commit itself to external borrowing limits via IMF
conditionality. In almost all reschedulings, the country is required to under-
take an upper—tranche, high conditionality loan from the IMF. Such loans typi-
cally restrict public sector borrowing from the international capital markets.
We conclude this discussion with a simple illustration of the resche-
duling process. We plan to present a complete formal analysis of rescheduling
in a later work. We assume the following technological uncertainty:
(37) Qi Q
Qi = Q with probability 1-"
=
€Q ( e < 1) with probability ', for i = 2,3;
Q2 and Q3 are independently distributed.
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Thus, supply shocks occur randomly in the second and third periods with probabi-
lity ii . Utility is assumed to be linear and additive: U = C1 + c2/(i+ó) +
C3/(i+o)2. All debt is assumed to be short term.
For iT and U close to zero, we have the following bond—market
equilibrium:
(38) (1+r12) = (1+p)/(1—Tr)
If Q2 = Q, repay; if Q2 = default.
When Q2 = Q, borrow again, with 23 =
If Q3 = Q, repay; if Q3 = default.
Thus, the supply shock in either period triggers default. D23 is picked so that
in the third period, the country is indifferent between repayment of
(1+r23)D23 and default, when Q3 = . Thus, D23 = A (i_lT)/(i+p). Similarly,
D12 is picked so that in the second period, the country is indifferent between
repayment of (1+r12)D12 and default, when Q2 =
We get a very different equilibrium if the banks and country can renegotiate
whenever default is imminent. And, importantly, in this simple model, both the
country and the banks are indifferent between the rescheduling and cancellation
methods of debt relief, since the same real resource flows are achieved under
each approach (this seems to be a general result, although we have not yet
proved it in other cases).
Let us examine debt cancellation first. As usual, we must analyze the
equilibrium backwards, starting at the third period. After period two, loans
D3 are made, such that (1 +r3)D23 = A (the superscript C denote "cancellation
model"). If Q3 = a, then the debt must be partially cancelled, with A tQ
repaid and (1+r3)D3 — A t, or A (i—e), cancelled.
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In the second period, the country must decide whether to default, or to
repay and borrow again. Comparing these two alternatives, the country would
choose to default when:-
(39) (1+r2)D2 > AQ + AE(Q3)/(1+p)
That is, the threat of default is present when the required debt
repayments
exceed the discounted value of future expected penalties from default.
Now (1+r2)D2 is set so that (1+r2)D2 = A + A E(Q3)/(1+p). In
that case, according to (39), the debt is repaid when Q2 = Q and must be par-
tially cancelled when Q2 =
. Clearly, from (39), the bank can demand
repayment in the amount of A i + AE(Q3)/(1+p). The value of the cancelled
portion is therefore A (i—u).
Now r?2 and r3 are determined by zero—profit conditions. Letting
C2 and C3 be the amount of debt cancellations (if required) in the second and
third periods, the interest rates are chosen so that:
(40) - D2 + [(1-1(1+r2)D2 + [(1+r2)D2 - C2]]/(1+p) = 0
C C C C C
- D23 + [(1-u)(1+r23)D23 + [(i+r3)i3 - C3]]/(1+p) = 0
The rescheduling process is closely related to cancellation. Now sup-
pose that D2 is lent in the first period, and is fully paid up when =
but not when Q2 = U. In this latter case the bank demands A in repayment,
and 'reloans" the rest, L = (1+r2)D2 — A t, say at the initial interest rate
r2. Then, in the third period, the bank receives mm (L(1+r2), AQ3), and the
rest of the debt is cancelled. In fact, it will always be the case that
L(1+r2) exceeds A Q3 (whether Q3 = or
€t), so that the bank in fact receives
A Q3 in the third period.-t2/
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In terms of real resource flows, this constitutes the same equilibrium
as with debt cancellation, as long as D2 and r2 are picked optimally! In
fact, we simply set D2 D2 and r2 = r2, and check that the equilibrium is
the same. Some guidance is provided in Table 2. The key point is that debt
cancellation cum relending yields the same second—period real resource flow to
the country as does rescheduling.
III. Conclusions
The presence of default risk in international lending has pervasive
effects on capital markets and macroeconomic equilibrium in borrowing countries.
These effects are magnified by the lack of bond covenants in international loan
agreements, because moral hazards for the borrower abound in the international
markets.
It is useful to enumerate some of the implications of default risk that
we have shown. Default risk leads to:
1. Credit rationing, with under—investment and under-consumption.
2. Mi incentive for pre—cominitment to an investment program, if such
pre—commitment is feasible, (and an incentive for subsidization of
domestic investment).
3. An upward-sloping supply schedule of loans, until a loan ceiling is
reached.
4. A strong incentive for ex post negotiation between creditors and




A Comparison of Debt Cancellation and Debt Rescheduling
Cancellation Rescheduling
First
C C R RPeriod Loan (1+r12)D12 Loan (1+r12)D12
Second
Period If Q2 = Q, full repayment If Q2 = , full repayment
and new loan D3 and new loan D3
If Q2 = , repayment of If Q2 = e, repayment of
A 2 + AE(Q3)/(1+p)
New loan of D3 The remainder rescheduled
Net resource flow to country: Net resource flow to country:
D3 - [A 2 + AE(Q3)/(1+p)], - A
which ecjuals - A
Third
Period: If Q3 = , banks receive If = , banks receive
C C —(1+r23)D23, which equals AQ
If Q3 = U, banks receive If Q3 = t, banks receive
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. An incentive to avoid long-term debt maturities in favor of short—
term maturities.
6. A bias towards long-term investment projects and away from short-
term projects.
7. No particular relationship between the penalties for default ( A)
and the probability of default in equilibrium.
The various models introduced here are still rudimentary, and we plan extensions
in a variety of directions. It is most important to extend the analysis to a
multi—period (or infinite—horizon) setting, in order to study a country's incen-
tive to maintain a reputation, even when there are short-run gains to be had by
threatening or carrying out a default. Also, we plan to study how different
degrees of risk aversion of borrowers and lenders will affect the capital market
equilibrium. Finally, we must examine more closely the determinants of A
,
the




1. That is (p).(1+ > (-(i+p)
2. This is shown by simple perturbation argument. Suppose that an equilibrium
is reached with positive Ii and a default cutoff for Q2. By reducing Ii
and raising C1
, keeping the cutoff fixed, the welfare change is positive.
And by changing the cutoff point optimally, EU can be raised even more.
3. The proof is as follows. From the first—order condition,
( ó. p) = ( A1)
dlydDl , or (i+o) = (1+p) + ( AiQ) d1/dD1 . Since (1+r)(1-ir) = (1+p)
dJT/dDl =
_[(1_11)/(1+r)] dr/dD1 . Also, A1Q1 = (1+r)Di
Therefore, (i+o) (1+p) — (1+r)Di [(1)/(1+r)] dr/dD1 . Upon rearranging
(i+) (1+p) — Di(1_it) dr/dD1 = (1—li) [(1-'-r) — (dr/dD1)D1] =
(i—n) 4_. [(1+r)D1] . Q.E.D.
4. We model a zero—coupon bond here, although there would no difference with a
coupon bond, with second—period interest p
5. To derive the condition for (li-r13), note that loan market equilibrium
requires:
1 + + i_1r)(1+ri3) =1P (i+p)2
By re-arranging, we find (1+ri3) = (1+p)(2+p)/(2+p_
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6. The fact that C1, C2 remain unchanged is obvious. To check for C3, first
note that (1+r13)dDl3 + (1+r23)dD23 = (1+r13) c- (1+r23) (1+p- r13) = 0
by the conditions on (1+r13) and (1+r23). Thus, 11 remains unchanged, as
N D
do C3 and C3.




d dD3 = (2+ p — i2 dD23
d(1+r23) dr23 dii (1+p) diiSimilarly,
dD23 d (-3 (i '.i)2 dD23 Thus, from (35)(c),
=
D13 (1+p)(2+p) d at (1+) D23 (i+) dir.
(2+p— ii)2
+ (i- + (i_'2
dirAlso, — = f()(1+p), where f(•) is evaluated at (1+r13)D13 +dD23
(1+r23)D23. Thus, combining all of the pieces,
dir
—





8. In fact, the condition is
(1+r12)D12 = + A (1_ir)/(1+)] + [(
-P)/(1÷ô)]D23
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9. If the country defaults, expected utility is (1_A)Q2 + (1_A)E(Q3)/(1+a). If
the country re-pays, and borrows again, utility is [Q2
— (l+r12)D12] +
D23 + E(Q3)/(1+) — (1+P)D23/(1+o). Also, (l+P)D23 AE(Q3). Thus,
expected utility after default exceeds expected utility without default if
and only if (39) is satisfied.
10. The rescheduling scheme described here, in which the country pays 2 in the
second period, is optimal from the banks' point of view. Let
R2 equal second—period payments by the country
R3 equal third-period payments when Q3 = Q
A equal third—period payments when Q3 =
The bank seeks to maximize the discounted expected stream of payments
R2 + R3 (1_n)/(1+p) + AtQ1T/(1+p), subject to the constraints that: (1)
the country will be indifferent between such re-payments and default, and




In this appendix we derive the current account equation (1k) in the
text. This derivation is a discrete—time version of the formulation in Sachs
(1981b), where further details are available.
Following the notation in the text:
(A.l) CAt = Qt—Ct—Gt—It—rDt_1
We specify a production technolor with a fixed capital—output ratio:
(A.2) Kt = Qt
with investment given by:
(A.3) It = Kt+i_Kt
Since Dt = CAt + Dt_i, we use (A.1) and the transversality con-
dition urn (1+r).-ti = 0 to derive the interteinporal budget constraint:
(A.4) E(l+r)_t(Ct+It÷Gt) = ti+tQt — DO
Now, it is convenient to introduce the concept of the "permanent" or "perpetuity—
equivalent" level of a variable. Let X signify the value of X such that
(A.5) E (l+r)_tXP = E (l+r) Xt
t=l t=l
Equivalently, X = r E (l+rYtXt
t=1
Thus, the budget constraint (A.) may be re—written as
(A.6) + + G =
— rDO
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Now we solve the consumer problem. As a special case, we assume that
household's choose their intertemporal consumption path to maximize
(A.T) U =
subject to (A.L)
The solution to this problem is:
(A.8) C1 =
Ct = C1[(i+r)/(l+ö)]t—1 t > 1
Note that C/r is the discounted value of all household consumption. We
define W1 C/r as household wealth.
Using (A.l), (A.6) and (A.8), and the definition of wealth, it is
straightforward to write:
(A.9) CAi = (Q1_Q1P) — (Gi—c1P) — (11—11P) + wi
The final step in the derivation is to re—write (11_11P) in terms of
the underlying output fluctuations. First, we re—write I, by recognizing
that
(A.lO) I = rE(l+r)_tlt = ru(1+r)_t(Qt+1_Qt)
The last term in (A.iO) may be re—written as u (l+r)QP — ) QP — ru Qi, or as
ru (QP Qi). Note that ru is the share of capital in total costs, Sk. Thus,
(A.9) may be re—written as in the text:
(A.lO) CAl = (l—Sk)(Q1—Q1P) — (Gi—G1P) + [(r—S)/(i+6)] Wi — Ii
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